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Social security 
and development 
in Latin America 
Carmelo Mesa-Lago* 
This article is a summary of a longer study by the 
author which was commissioned by ECLAC, on the 
financial situation of social security in 20 Latin 
American countries. These countries are grouped 
according to their social security situation, and their 
similarities, differences and trends with respect to 
financing and financial equilibrium are examined. Of 
the wide variety of topics covered in such a vast area 
of study the author focuses on the historical 
evolution of social security, problems of coverage, 
benefits, financing and costs and the impact of social 
security on development. 
As a result of his study, the author concludes 
that urgent reform of social security is needed: in the 
pioneer countries, in order to face problems of short-
term financing, the vestiges of stratification and the 
maintenance of the level of basic benefits; and in the 
countries which have newer social security systems, 
in order to extent the coverage through a system of 
financing that can guarantee long-term benefits. 
Introduction 
During the hundred years since the introduction 
of social security in Germany —the predecessor 
of the modern programmes— significant 
progress has been made ¡n this area in many 
Latin American countries. These programmes 
have played a fundamental part in preventing 
loss of income by the head of the family through 
social risks and in advancing curative medicine. 
By the end of the last century programmes 
already existed in the region for protecting 
public employees and the military, and from the 
beginning of this century, groups of workers in 
strategic sectors such as public services enjoyed 
this protection. In 1984, 70 and 60 years, had 
elapsed respectively since the first laws were 
enacted in the hemisphere to cover workers 
against occupational accidents and diseases 
(Uruguay) and against the risks of old age, 
disability, death and ordinary illness (Chile). 
These countries were ahead of the United States 
in introducing this type of programme and are 
ahead of that country even today in programmes 
such as mother and child health and family 
allowances. As in other areas, Latin America 
leads the Third World in its development of 
social security.1 
But progress in social security has not been 
consistent throughout the region and faces 
serious problems, even in countries which have 
achieved greater development. While it is true 
that several countries have succeeded in 
providing coverage for the entire population, 
when Brazil (where more than half of the 
persons covered are concentrated is excluded), 
the overall coverage of the region falls short of 
43% and in the majority of the countries it is 
lower than 25%. To this must be added the 
significant inequalities in coverage by 
occupational category, sector of economic 
activity and geographical unit. In many countries 
the cost of social security is excessive compared 
with their economic capacity. At the beginning 
of the 1970s, the social security burden in the two 
* ECLAC consultant and Director of the Center for 
Latin American Studies of the University of Pittsburgh. 1A summary of the progress made in social security in Latin 
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pioneer countries reached 14% and 17% of the 
gross domestic product: a proportion which, at 
the world level, was only exceeded in the most 
industrialized countries of Europe. At the 
beginning of the 1980s, that burden approached 
or surpassed 10% of the gross domestic product 
in five countries, equalling the percentage in 
Japan and being comparable to that of the 
United States, the USSR, Spain, Australia and 
New Zealand (13-14%). 
During the 1960s, social security in the 
pioneer countries showed an actuarial and 
sometimes financial imbalance which worsened 
in the 1970s and was complicated even more by 
the economic crisis of those years. In an attempt 
to resolve this situation, a number of Latin 
For purposes of simplicity, the term 'social 
security' is used systematically throughout this 
article and encompasses five main programmes: 
occupational hazards (health and money 
coverage against occupational accidents and 
illness); old age, disability and survivars, 
pensions (as well as seniority, and lay-off or 
dismissal pensions in some countries); health 
care and money benefits in case of illness, 
ordinary or non-labour accidents and maternity; 
family allowances; and unemployment benefits. 
In addition, social security frequently includes 
other benefits such as funeral assistance, 
personal and housing loans, day-care centres for 
children, as well as public assistance or social 
programmes (health care and pensions for low-
income groups which cannot join the 
contributory programmes). 
Technically speaking, the majority of the 
countries of Latin America have mandatory 
social insurance systems or are between the stage 
of social insurance and the more advanced stage 
of full social security, which are two different 
concepts of social protection. Only a few 
American countries have restructured their 
social security, the most important —and 
diametrically opposed— reforms being those 
bringing the Cuban system under State control 
and putting the Chilean system in private hands. 
Apart from the economic importance of 
social security, the way in which it is financed can 
affect the replacement of labour by capital, the 
generation of savings and investment and 
income distribution. It is only recently that 
certain regional or international development 
agencies have begun to study social security in 
Latin America from the economic standpoint 
and to include this subject in some of their 
country studies. 
countries have systems with features that are 
more typical of social security than of social 
insurance. Social insurance, which was 
introduced into Germany by Otto Bismarck in 
the 1880s, is based on employment relations 
which shape the system: i) separate 
programmes to cover different social risks 
(especially occupational hazards, pensions and 
sickness); ii) coverage of the essentially urban 
labour force employed in a relationship of 
dependence (wage-earners); iii) tripartite 
salary-based contributions (paid by the person 
insured, the employer and the State); 
iv) benefits directly linked to contributions; and 
v) technical/financial capitalization systems. 
Social security, which started out in the 
United Kingdom with the ideas contained in Sir 
William Beveridge's report at the beginning of 
the 1940s —with a strong Keynesian 
influence— is based on a series of innovative 
principles which promote: i) unification —under a 
single managing or co-ordinating body— of the 
various social insurance programmes with 
public assistance and health care (combining 
I 
The historical evolution of social security 
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preventive and curative medicine) and with 
employment programmes and family 
allowances (principle of unity) ;ii) uniformity of 
the conditions for acquiring rights and 
elimination of unjustified inequalities among 
the persons insured (principle of equality); 
iii) total coverage of the population, whether 
employed or unemployed (principle of 
universality) and of all social risks (principle of 
comprehensiveness); iv) financing through 
taxation, minimum basic but adequate benefits 
—not linked to contributions— and progressive 
distribution of income (principle of solidarity); 
and v) technical/financial distribution systems 
(Mesa-Lago, 1959). 
1. The pioneer countries and 
stratification 
In a small group of pioneer countries, which 
were the most developed ones (Chile, Uruguay, 
Argentina, Cuba, Brazil), the social security 
system emerged at an early stage (during the 
1920s) but it did so in a gradual and piecemeal 
fashion, giving rise to a multiplicity of managing 
inst i tut ions which protected different 
occupational groups through independent 
subsystems, with their own legislation, 
administration, financing and benefits. The 
State contributed to the financing of the 
subsystems through the creation of specific taxes 
or direct budgetary support. The subsystems 
gradually incorporated broader occupational 
groups or labour sectors as well as their 
dependents, but generally with more scanty 
benefits and more stringent conditions for 
acquiring the right to benefits. The process by 
which the subsystems made their appearance 
was approximately as follows: first they were 
extended to the armed forces, public employees 
and teachers; then to employees and workers in 
transport, energy, banking, communications and 
other public services, much later to the mass of 
urban workers and employees (frequently 
separated into two large groups), and finally to 
agricultural workers and self-employed 
(independent) workers, small farmers and 
entrepreneurs, and domestic servants. 
This type of evolution resulted in a stratified 
social security system, since it acquired a 
pyramidal structure, with relatively small groups 
of persons protected by privileged subsystems at 
the apex of the centre and the majority of the 
population with subsystems providing less 
protection at the base. There were significant 
and usually unjustified differences between the 
subsystems and the overall system lacked co-
ordination. The stratified system had negative 
effects: legal confusion, administrative 
complexity, high operating costs, difficulty in 
establishing a single register and effective 
control of evasion, obstacles to combining length 
of service and contribution accredited in various 
institutions, and considerable inequalities. 
The theories seeking to explain the 
evolution of social security identify among its 
basic causes economic development2 and the 
dissemination or demonstration effect 
generated by international agencies and pioneer 
countries (Collier and Messick, 1975), but those 
theories do not explain the phenomenon of 
stratification. Considerable debate has been 
going on for a decade now about the two main 
driving forces of this phenomenon: the pressure 
groups and the State. The power base of the 
occupational groups described lies in their 
military strength, their administration of the 
government, the scarcity of their skills on the 
labour market and their union organization, 
and they bring pressure to bear on the State 
—sometimes in conjunction with political 
parties— in order to obtain social security 
concessions. Studies on various countries in the 
region show that, in general, the more powerful 
the pressure groups are, the greater the extent to 
which they enjoy earlier and more 
comprehensive coverage, more generous 
benefits and more advantageous means of 
financing (Mesa-Lago, 1977a and 1978). The 
State cannot be a mere passive receiver of 
pressures from groups. It must also exercise its 
^Pauker (1968) has tried to prove that the financial burden of 
social security is a result of economic development and that the 
greater thai burden, the greater will be the redistribution function 
of the system. Zschock ( 1985) also contends that social security 
extends and becomes less inequitable with economic growth and 
growth of the size of the government. In contrast, Aaron (1967) 
has produced evidence that refutes the above viewpoint and 
sustains the theory that the age of the system is the most important 
variable explaining the level of expenditure on social security. 
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own initiative by using social security as the 
instrument to co-opt, neutralize and control 
those groups in order to maintain some sort of 
social order (Malloy, 1979)- The evolution in 
which the role of the pressure groups have been 
preponderant is typical of the populist and 
democratic-pluralist political systems such as 
those in Chile and Uruguay during the first 
seven decades of the twentieth century. The 
evolution in which the role of the State has been 
preponderant is more typical of political systems 
which, while also populist, have an authoritarian 
and corporatist inclination such as those in 
Brazil under Getulio Vargas and Argentina 
under Juan Perón. In practice, both forces (the 
pressure groups and the State) have worked 
hand-in-hand in both types of political systems 
and it is sometimes difficult to determine which 
was the predominant one (Mesa-Lago, 1977b). 
As economic development, urbanization, 
trade union and political mobilization processes 
advanced in the pioneer countries, the groups 
which enjoyed no protection gained enough 
power to secure coverage within already existing 
or new subsystems. In some countries, they were 
even able to secure some benefits that had been 
reserved for the old systems, thereby achieving 
some extension of privileges to the masses. The 
cost of the process of making coverage universal, 
combined with the generous benefits and the 
liberal conditions for acquiring them, became 
excessive and created a financial imbalance in 
many subsystems. 
Social security reform, promoted by national 
and international technical studies, advocated 
the unification and uniformity of the subsystems 
and the elimination of costly privileges. But the 
groups were so powerful that the State was 
compelled to postpone the reforms, sometimes 
for decades. The political changes that occurred 
in these countries during the 1960s and 1970s 
reinforced the State power vis-a-vis the pressure 
groups (which in many cases were disbanded or 
had their power significantly reduced) and 
facilitated the process of reforming social 
security (Borzutsky, 1984). 
In some countries (Cuba, Brazil), virtually 
the entire system was unified, in others 
(Argentina, Uruguay) a central integrating or 
co-ordinating agency was formed which 
combined different organizations under a 
uniform system and finally in one country 
(Chile) some measures were taken to make the 
old system uniform and eliminate privileges, but 
above all a new system was created, strongly 
influenced by private insurance and favouring 
individuality and multiplicity. 
2. Countries with relatively 
unified systems 
The second form of evolution of social security 
took place in countries whose main systems were 
established since the 1940s and were influenced 
by the new trends inspired by the International 
Labour Organisation and the Beveridge report, 
which sought to avoid the problems created in 
the pioneer countries. At the time, some of the 
countries in question were relatively developed 
(Mexico), but most of them had a low level of 
industrial development and in almost all of them 
the rural sector predominated over the urban 
sector. In these countries, a general managing 
agency was established which was responsible 
for eventually covering the entire population, 
although at the start the system was limited to 
the capital and the main cities. 
In the more developed countries of this 
second group, before the establishment of the 
general managing agency there had been a 
number of social security institutions which 
protected the most powerful pressure groups: 
the armed forces, public employees, teachers, 
and energy and railroad workers (Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela). 
Furthermore, in some countries (Mexico, Costa 
Rica) a number of exceptions were made after 
the general managing agency was created, with a 
view to establishing separate subsystems for 
certain groups (almost always in the public 
sector). However, these groups were usually 
small and (except for the armed forces and 
public employees) represented only a small 
percentage of the coverage provided by the 
general managing agency. 
In any event, although there is a certain 
degree of stratification in all these countries, it 
has never approached the level it reached in the 
first group. Because social security was 
introduced later in this second group, and also 
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because of its relative unity and uniformity and 
its lower coverage of risk and population, these 
systems generally did not face the administrative 
and financial problems of the first group and 
therefore no radical changes were needed. Even 
so, however, the countries heading this group 
(those with the highest coverage, growing 
maturity of the pension programme and high 
costs) are beginning to face the financial 
problems typical of the first group. Costa Rica is 
the most serious case since, because of its policy 
of speeding up population coverage in the 1960s 
and 1970s, its social security costs are close to 
those of the countries in the first group even 
though its pension programme has still not fully 
matured. 
3. Countries which introduced social 
security at a later stage 
Lastly, we can identify a third group of countries 
which also have relatively unified social security 
systems: indeed, to a greater degree than those of 
the second group. These are the least developed 
countries of the region: Central America (except 
for Costa Rica and Panama) and the Latin 
American Caribbean (except for Cuba). In this 
group, social security did not generally appear 
until the 1950s and 1960s, and the general 
managing agency covers virtually all the persons 
insured (although the armed forces and 
sometimes public employees have separate 
subsystems); population coverage is very low 
and sometimes limited to the capital city and the 
most heavily populated cities. These countries 
are not usually faced with short and medium-
term financial difficulties, and their main 
problem is to extend coverage to the population 
at large. 
Although in general the unification process 
has advanced in the region, there are still 
stratified systems or systems whose unification 
process has not been completed. Furthermore, 
the integration of the health institutions (social 
security, the Ministry of Health, etc.) and their 
policies is urgently needed in the majority of the 
countries. Finally, with very few exceptions, 
social security has not been incorporated into the 
national plans. This incorporation would 
facilitate the processes both of unifying social 
security and of uniting social security and health. 
II 
Problems of coverage, benefits, 
financing and costs 
1. Coverage 
In general, the figures on statistical coverage of 
the population by social security are very 
inadequate. The ECLAC study —based on a survey 
and relatively uniform calculations—shows that 
in 1980, 61% of the total population and of the 
economically active population (EAP) were 
covered for health and pensions respectively. 
However, when Brazil is excluded from the 
calculations, the regional coverage falls to 43% 
and in the majority of countries does not even 
reach 25 %. The most developed countries of the 
region were the first to introduce social security 
and currently have the highest coverage of the 
population, whereas the least developed have 
the lowest coverage: 100% to 75% in Cuba, 
Brazil, Argentina and Costa Rica; 74% to 50% 
in Uruguay, Chile, Mexico and Panama (the first 
two countries would probably fall in the first 
group if coverage of indigents and coverage by 
mutual funds were to be added); 49% to 25 % in 
Venezuela and Bolivia; and 24% to 1% in 
Paraguay, Peru, Guatemala, Colombia, 
Nicaragua, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, 
Honduras, El Salvador and Haiti (the countries 
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are placed in descending order of coverage). 
In the majority of the countries, the persons 
insured are urban wage-earners (and their close 
dependents) whereas agricultural workers, 
independent workers (or the self-employed), 
domestic servants and the unemployed (as well 
as the dependence of all these) are not insured. 
In approximately a quarter of the countries 
—the least developed ones— coverage is limited 
to the capital and the most important cities. The 
economic crisis of the present decade has caused 
a decline in coverage in several countries because 
of the increase in unemployment, self-
employment and evasion. 
There seems to be a positive correlation 
between the degree of coverage by social 
security, on the one hand, and the labour skills, 
income and level of development of the regions 
of a country, on the other. A recent study of 
Brazil shows a positive correlation between the 
degree of coverage and level of skills or 
employment status and income, with the lowest 
coverage being recorded among the 
unemployed, unskilled workers (especially 
agricultural or self-employed workers) and those 
with the lowest income. The information from 
four countries (Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica and 
Mexico) on the level of coverage ( 1979-1981 ) of 
the economically active population by sector of 
economic activity indicates that the highest 
coverage is recorded in electricity, gas and water 
(75% to 100%), manufacturing (51% to 90%) 
and transport and communications (34% to 
71%), whereas the lowest is found in agriculture 
(4% to 59%, with the highest percentages being 
registered in Costa Rica and Chile, the countries 
which come closest to total coverage). Finally, 
information from six countries (Chile, Costa 
Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama and Peru) on 
the differences in the level of geographical 
coverage (1979-1981) shows that the most 
developed states/provinces/departments 
(industrialized, unionized, urbanized, with the 
highest percentage of wage-earners and highest 
per capita income) have significantly higher 
coverage than the least developed 
states/provinces/departments (agricultural, 
little unionized, rural, with the highest 
percentage of independent workers and the 
lowest per capita income). The extremes of 
geographical coverage fluctuate between 39% 
and 95 % in Chile, 54% and 100% in Costa Rica, 
0.2% and 33% ¡n Guatemala, 5% and 100% in 
Mexico, 13% and 73% in Panama, and 3% and 
27% in Peru. With one exception, the 
province/state/department in which the capital 
city is located has the highest coverage. To 
summarize, the most needy groups are not 
provided with social security protection in the 
vast majority of the countries and so the key 
question is whether it is feasible to extend 
coverage to include those groups (ECLAC, 1985; 
Isuani, 1984, pp. 96 and 97; Isuani and Mesa-
Lago, 1981). 
The low coverage and its slow extension in 
the region appear to have a relation with the 
Bismarckian model, imported from Europe, 
which is financed by the wage contributions of 
the persons insured and employers. In many 
Latin American countries, it is not wage-earners 
who constitute the majority of the labour force 
but rather unpaid independent or family 
workers. It is not surprising, then, that the most 
developed countries of the region have the 
highest percentages both of the wage-earning 
labour force and of social security coverage, 
whereas the least developed countries have the 
lowest percentages of both. As a general rule, 
coverage does not exceed the percentage of the 
urban formal sector (in some countries it also 
includes the rural modern sector) leaving the 
urban informal and rural traditional sectors 
without any protection. A few countries have 
succeeded in changing the system of financing 
and in incorporating the sector not covered, 
through public assistance programmes (Chile, 
Costa Rica, Cuba) or transfers from the urban to 
the rural sector (Brazil) or special programmes 
to cover the peasant population (Ecuador, 
Mexico). 
One of the most serious problems facing 
social security in the region is how to speed up 
extension of coverage and reduce its inequalities 
despite the structural and conjunctural obstacles. 
2. Benefits 
The pioneer countries in social security 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay) cover all the 
social risks with different programmes: 
SOCIAL SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT / Carmela Mesa-Luf-o 141 
pens ions , h e a l t h / m a t e r n i t y , occupat ional 
hazards, unemployment and family allowances 
(Cuba has no official programme of family 
allowances or unemployment benefit, but the 
latter does not appear to be necessary because of 
the virtually full employment situation). The 
older the social security system of a country, the 
more generous are the benefits and the more 
flexible the conditions for acquiring rights: the 
retirement age is relatively early because the 
original legislation was enacted when life-
expectancy was lower; pensions are granted on 
the basis of length of service —regardless of the 
age of the person insured— which makes it 
possible to retire at a very early age; very costly 
health benefits are granted such as contact lens, 
orthodontics, and treatment abroad; and there 
are "social benef i t s" such as housing 
programmes, mortgage and personal loans, co-
operative stores and sports and cultural services. 
In the pioneer countries, the bulk of the 
expenditure on benefits is for pensions, reaching 
80% in Uruguay, and this proportion is on the 
increase because of the maturity of the pension 
programme and the increasing longevity of the 
pensioners. This tendency, combined with 
demographic and financial factors, appears to 
lead eventually to financial imbalance. 
The stratification of the typical social 
security system of the pioneer countries (at least 
until the unification and uniformity processes 
were introduced) has led to significant 
inequalities in benefits, since the most powerful 
groups receive more and better benefits than the 
least powerful. In a study of five countries, the 
legal differences between the five groups 
covered were measured on the basis of six 
criteria: conditions for acquiring the right to 
benefits; base salary used to compute benefits; 
amount of benefit; pension cost-of-living 
adjustment; possibility of obtaining several 
pensions or combining one pension with a paid 
job; and time required to apply for and receive 
the benefit. The study also compared the 
availability of health services (hospital beds and 
doctors per insured person) and their quality for 
the various groups. The groups were placed on 
the following order, from best to worse: 
i) armed forced, ii) public employees, iii) élite of 
the working class, iv) private non-manual 
workers and v) rank and file manual workers. 
The study points out, however, that a process of 
extending privileges to the masses frequently 
occurs in the pioneer countries, so that the 
groups at the base of the pyramid are sometimes 
able to secure some of the benefits that were 
previously reserved for the groups at the top 
(Mesa-Lago, 1978). 
The countries where social security was 
introduced later do not usually have as many 
p r o g r a m m e s as the p ioneer countr ies . 
Moreover, many of these countries have given 
priority to vertical rather than horizontal 
expansion of social security. The small 
percentage of the population covered receives 
more and more benefits and this has increased 
the difficulty of extending coverage to the bulk of 
the population. Hence, the greatest source of 
inequality in these countries is the low 
population coverage. In this group of countries, 
up to 80% of the expenditure on benefits is 
allocated to the health programme and the 
increasing reserves of the pension programme 
are often used partly to finance the construction 
and equipment of hospitals. Although it may be 
justifiable from a social point of view, this 
investment is not financially profitable and 
gradually whittles away the capital of the 
pension fund, so that when the pension 
programme matures, the entire system is faced 
with financial disequilibrium. 
3. Financing and costs 
Social security in Latin America is financed 
basically by contributions calculated on the basis 
of the nominal salary which, according to the 
law, are paid by the person insured and his 
employer and also by the State in some countries. 
The older the social security system of a country 
and the wider the coverage, the higher the 
percentage of total wage contributions, and the 
larger that portion which, by law, must be paid 
by the employer (the effect of this contribution is 
discussed in the following section). In the 
pioneer countries, the total wage contribution 
fluctuates between 26% and 46% and was even 
higher before several countries reduced it or 
replaced it by a value-added tax. 
Depending on the percentage of the wage 
contribution and the breakdown of the income 
collected by source, the insured person pays less 
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than one-third of the social security burden. The 
remaining two-thirds are paid by the employer 
and to a lesser extent by the State; income from 
investments represents less than one-tenth of 
the income. Consequently, according to the law 
(without taking incidence into account) the 
insured person finances only a fraction of the 
benefits, and this situation is made potentially 
more unfair in countries with very low 
population coverage. In the Dominican 
Republic, for example, coverage is lower than 
8% and the insured person contributes 17% of 
the total wage contribution, which would 
suggest that the uninsured population (through 
possible transfers to prices and taxes) helps to 
finance the social security of the small 
percentage which is covered. 
Another serious problem is the evasion of 
payment by employers, resulting from poor 
techniques of registration, identification and 
control of payments. Inflation has aggravated 
this problem, since any delay in making 
cont r ibu t ions reduces the i r real value. 
Furthermore, the State frequently fails to fulfil 
its obligations not only as a tripartite contributor 
but also as an employer. In countries like Costa 
Rica, Ecuador and Peru, the State debt has 
reached a la rming p ropo r t i ons and has 
sometimes even threatened the financial balance 
of the social security system. 
Social security costs in Latin America are the 
highest of the developing countries and are close 
to those of developed countries like Japan. 
According to the 1985 ECLAC report, in 1980 
social security costs, as a percentage of the gross 
domestic product, fluctuated between 1% and 
1 1 % as follows (the countries are placed in 
descending order of percentages): 1 1 % to 10% 
in Uruguay, Chile and Argentina; 9% to 7% in 
Cuba, Costa Rica and Panama; 6% to 4% in 
Brazil and Colombia; 3% in Mexico, Peru, 
Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and Honduras; 2% 
in Paraguay, the Domin ican Republ ic , 
Guatemala, Nicaragua and El Salvador; and 1% 
in Haiti. In many countries of the region, social 
security is faced with an actuarial imbalance and, 
in some, even with a short-term financial crisis. 
The pioneer countries with the oldest 
systems usually have the highest costs and are in 
the worst actuarial and financial situation. The 
expenses systematically increase for the 
following reasons: the almost universal 
population coverage; very generous benefits; the 
maturity of pension programmes; the growing 
numbers of pensioners who retire early and live 
longer than initially projected; the cost-of-living 
adjustment of pensions, and the growing 
expenses of curative medicine (in proportion as 
the pathological profile comes to resemble that 
of the developed countries). Furthermore, the 
system's revenue is proportionately smaller 
because of the impossibility or difficulty of 
extending the coverage beyond the point 
reached; evasion and delay in payment of 
contributions (especially in countries with high 
inflation); failure by the State to fulfil its 
obligations; the difficulty of increasing 
contributions (since they are already very high); 
and the very low or negative profitability of the 
investments. 
The economic crisis of the current decade 
has aggravated the financial problems. The 
increase in unemployment, the decline in real 
wages and the bankruptcy of many enterprises 
have reduced the income of the social security 
system. The cost of servicing the external debt 
and other domestic priorities exercise strong 
pressure on the State to reduce or postpone its 
social security obligations. In some countries, the 
costs of the system are still growing because of 
the structural and conjunctural reasons stated. 
In the countries with the oldest pension 
programmes, a gradual change has occurred in 
the method of financing. There has been a shift 
from the "uniform average premium" method to 
the "phased average premium" method and then 
to the "distribution" method. This means that 
capitalization (aimed at ensuring the payment of 
future pensions for a long period ahead) is 
replaced by distribution (which tends to ensure 
payment only on the basis of the costs of the 
current year). Since costs increase every year 
(because of the growing numbers of pensioners) 
the burden is being transferred to future 
generations, where an increasingly small 
proportion of active workers must pay growing 
contributions. The viability of this transfer is 
politically and economically doubtful. The 
country in the worst situation in the region is 
Uruguay, which in 1983 had a demographic 
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burden ratio of 0.8, in other words, 
approximately one active person had to finance 
one non-working person (in contrast, the 
actuarial calculations of the United States project 
that, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, 
the ratio will be two active persons financing 
one non-working person.) If these countries 
were unable to achieve actuarial and financial 
balance when the ratio of the demographic 
burden was much lower, they will be less able to 
do so in the future when the ratio will be much 
higher. 
This section examines the impact of Latin 
American social security on three decisive 
aspects of development: savings and 
investment, distribution and employment. It 
should be noted from the outset that neither the 
theory nor the empirical studies are conclusive in 
these matters and that their analysis is made 
even more difficult in the case of Latin America 
because of the absence or unreliability of 
information on the functional distribution of 
income between labour and capital, the impact of 
social security contributions and taxes, the 
proper measurement of benefits (especially 
health benefits) and the various effects on the 
conduct of employers and workers (Musgrove, 
1984). Nevertheless, a summary is given here of 
the stage that the theoretical discussion has 
reached, the empirical evidence (which was 
almost always obtained from outside the region), 
and some studies carried out on specific 
countries and the criticisms of them. 
1. Savings and investment 
The impact of social security on savings and 
investment depends on the surplus in the social 
security accounts and the effect that this excess 
The Latin American countries with the most 
recent social security systems are not threatened 
with financial imbalance in the short and 
medium term (their main problem is how to 
extend the coverage of the population). 
Nevertheless, their social security systems 
basically follow the model of the pioneer 
countries, with the shortcomings described, so 
that they will eventually face similar problems. 
These countries, however, have more time to 
change the model for one which can extend the 
coverage on a more solid financial base. 
can have on other sources of domestic savings 
(private and public sectors) and external sources 
(Arellano, 1984; Wallich, 1982). The social 
security surplus or deficit derives from the 
factors of the system itself (for example, type of 
programmes, technical and financial system, 
degree of maturity, administrative costs) as well 
as exogenous factors (age structure of the 
population, rate of wage increases, general state 
of the economy). Short-term risk programmes 
(sickness, maternity, unemployment) usually 
follow the system of year-by-year distribution 
and generate a deficit rather than a surplus, 
whereas the long-term programmes (pensions), 
which use capitalization systems, generate 
sizeable reserves which are used as a basis for 
investment. Reference has already been made, 
however, to the general trend in the region to 
replace capitalization systems by distribution 
ones. Moreover, as will be seen subsequently, the 
region has a very poor record in respect of 
efficiency in investing the reserve funds. 
The impact of social security on investment 
also depends on the sources of financing and the 
incidence of the contribution; a recent 
IDB/INTAL study expresses the view that the 
investment rate declines more when social 
III 
The impact of social security 
on development 
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security really is financed by the employers than 
when it is paid for by the person insured or 
consumer (Arroba and others, 1980). The 
maturity of a pension programme depends 
inter alia on how long it has been in existence, 
the qualifying age for pensions, and the relative 
youth or age of the population; therefore, the 
older the programme, the lower the retirement 
age and the older the population, the greater will 
be the passive/active ratio and the smaller will 
be the surpluses and vice versa. A young 
population tends to grow rapidly, expanding the 
labour force, and if the coverage of the system 
increases its income will also increase; in 
contrast, in an aging population the potential 
number of contributors is reduced and the 
number of pensioners increases. If real wages are 
increasing, then the base of social security 
contributions is also increasing. On the other 
hand, a deep recession which reduces 
employment and real wages will have a negative 
impact on income and can reduce the surplus. 
The traditional approach is that social 
security reduces individual saving and the 
demand for private insurance, since the person 
insured expects that his contributions will be 
returned to him in the form of a pension and that 
therefore he does not have to accumulate a 
surplus during his working life. On the other 
hand, earlier retirement extends the period of 
retirement and this can stimulate savings during 
the active working life. The planning horizon of 
an insured person and his perception of the 
social security contribution (as a mere tax or as 
payment for future benefits, guaranteed by a 
healthy actuarial system) influence his attitudes 
towards saving and his preferences for a 
particular type of social security programme 
(short or long term). In the developed countries 
with older populations and more solvent social 
security, the horizon appears more distant than 
in Latin America, where, because of a younger 
population, financial imbalances in social 
security and high inflation, more relative 
importance is given to the short-term plans such 
as health and family allowances (Arellano, 1984 
and Musgrove, 1984). Social security and the 
government are competing for the same tax base 
and some assume that there is always a trade-off 
between them. But if there is not enough private 
saving and the State establishes a minimum 
income level, social security may eliminate State 
social assistance payments and reduce the public 
deficit. Social security can increase the cost of 
exports and make them less competitive 
(compared with those countries that have no 
social security or which have a smaller social 
security burden) and can thus contribute to a 
possible reduction of potential external saving. 
Debate and research on these subjects, 
carried on primarily in the United States and in 
other developed countries, have yielded 
contradictory results. A study of 16 OECD 
countries found no evidence that social security 
affects private savings or slows down 
development (Break, 1981; Koskela and Viren, 
1983). If it is so difficult to assess this impact in 
developed countries, where statistics are more 
accurately kept and social security coverage is 
universal, it is even more so in Latin America. 
Even within the same country interpretations 
are different: thus, in Chile one study (Wallich, 
1982) found that social security had had a 
negative impact on saving, but another later 
study (Arellano, 1984) took the view that after 
the necessary adjustments were made, social 
security was seen to have generated a surplus 
(albeit a declining one) instead of a negative 
saving. 
But if uncertainty exists over the above-
mentioned aspects there is no doubt, at least, 
about the inefficient investment of social 
security reserve funds in Latin America. In 1977, 
in 14 countries studied by ILO (1981), the 
percentage of social security income derived 
from investments was lower than 3-5% in nine 
of them. In almost the whole region, social 
security agencies are not designed to act as 
financial intermediaries, their staff has no 
investment experience, they have not developed 
an investment plan and they have not co-
ordinated their investments with national plans. 
Furthermore, there is little development of the 
capital market and inflation has whittled away 
the value of the reserves and given an incentive 
to employers to withhold their contributions and 
those of their employees, because by delaying 
payment their real value is reduced (Diéguez, 
1978). 
Reserves have usually been invested in: 
a) bonds and other State securities that are often 
not negotiable and in fact have been compulsory 
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loans to cover budgetary deficits, so that the 
agencies have wasted their funds on "worthless 
securities"; b) personal loans and mortgages, 
usually to the persons insured who, thanks to 
inflation (and the lack of loan adjustments) have 
obtained capital practically free and depleted the 
social security capital; c) loans to health 
programmes to cover their deficits, which are 
plausible from a social point of view but not 
profitable; d) loans for housing construction, 
very often to the persons insured themselves, 
which yield a very low or negative return, 
because of rent freezes, inefficient collection and 
amortization with depreciated money and e) in a 
few cases, investment in agriculture, industry, 
commerce (co-operative shops for the insured 
persons) and services (cinemas, theatres, sports) 
which also have a very low return (ILO, 1966). In 
virtually the whole region, the rate of return on 
the social security funds is only a fraction of the 
bank interest rate, and in many cases the real 
return has been negative. 
In practice, many of the investment 
programmes have amounted to disguised 
subsidies to insured persons and have caused the 
gradual decapitahzation of the social security 
reserves. This, in turn, has had a serious impact 
on the financial and actuarial equilibrium of 
social security in many countries of the region. 
2. Distribution of income 
and employment 
The impact of social security on income 
distribution is also a much discussed topic, on 
which there are few empirical studies in Latin 
America. A leading aspect is the ratio between 
coverage and distribution; in general, it can be 
said that the most universal systems are less 
regressive than those which provide low 
coverage. However, with very few exceptions, 
persons below the critical poverty line are not 
covered by social security; this is usually the case 
of the unemployed, of workers who work 
without pay for a relative or are self-employed, 
agricultural workers and domestic servants. A 
study conducted during the 1970s pointed out 
that while the most developed countries with a 
higher coverage were also those with the 
smallest proportion of poor people, the 
percentage of their economically active 
population which was not covered (except in 
Cuba) exceeded the percentage of the critically 
poor (Mesa-Lago, 1980). 
The manner of financing can be another 
cause of regression. In many countries, the 
insured person's wage contribution has a ceiling, 
so that, proportionally, those who gain more 
contribute less. It has already been said that more 
than two-thirds of the legal contribution is the 
responsibility of the State and the employer. The 
State contribution is sometimes made through a 
specific tax on the services or goods produced by 
the group that is covered, but which is paid by 
the entire population; thus, when social security 
coverage is very low, the effect of that tax is 
probably regressive, since the persons not 
covered, who are those with a lower income, 
contribute to the system without receiving 
anything in exchange. In other cases, the State 
deducts its contribution from its overall revenue; 
if the bulk of this revenue comes from sales taxes 
and these are imposed on both essential and 
luxury consumption alike, the effect must also be 
regressive when the coverage is low. It has been 
argued, on the other hand, that if there are State 
subsidies on basic goods and services or the bulk 
of the sales tax is levied on non-essential or 
luxury goods, the impact will probably be 
neutral, since the covered group is also the one 
on which the tax falls heaviest (Musgrove, 
1984). But even in this case, the group without 
coverage —which is the lowest income group 
and does not benefit from social security— will 
be contributing something to the system (for 
example by purchasing manufactured goods) 
and the possibility of its acquiring goods or 
services encumbered by the tax would be even 
more remote. Furthermore, in stratified social 
security systems, the State usually assigns a 
larger contribution (or pays a larger contribution 
itself) in the case of the relatively higher income 
groups, whereas it assigns a smaller contribution 
(or does not pay any contribution itself) in the 
case of the lower income groups. For example, 
the State covers the growing deficit of the 
subsystems of public employees and the armed 
forces, but delays or reduces its contributions to 
the general subsystem that covers the mass of 
workers. 
The incidence of the employer's 
contribution may be of three different types: the 
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employer may actually pay it; it may be "passed 
back", that is to say, the person insured may 
actually pay for it through a reduction in his real 
wages; or it may be "passed on": in other words, 
to the consumer through higher prices (Arroba 
and others, 1980, pp. 320-330). The theory is 
that in the long run the entrepreneur calculates 
not only wages but also all the additional benefits 
(including his contribution to social security) as 
his production cost and takes that total cost into 
account in his calculation of marginal 
productivity. 
Let us take the case of the initial introduction 
or subsequent increase of the employer's 
contribution to social security. It is assumed that 
in developed market economies, the labour 
supply is inelastic (at least with respect to the 
normal working day and the main family wage) 
and that the worker negotiates with his 
employer a wage compensation packet including 
additional benefits such as the social security 
contribution which the worker perceives as part 
of his salary. If, furthermore, social security 
coverage is almost universal and the employer's 
contribution is uniform (so that the worker 
cannot avoid its incidence by taking a job that is 
not covered or one with a lower contribution), it 
may be concluded that the worker absorbs that 
contribution by a reduction in his real wages. On 
the other hand, it is assumed that in developing 
economies the labour supply is elastic, because 
labour is plentiful and because the low social 
security coverage (or different contributions in 
stratified systems) make it possible for the 
worker to take jobs without coverage or with a 
lower contribution. It is assumed further that the 
worker does not perceive the employer's 
contribution as a part of his salary and that, 
therefore, there is no backward transfer. In this 
case, the employer has two options: he may 
transfer the contribution to the consumer by 
increasing prices, or reduce employment in line 
with the marginal productivity. Whatever he 
does, the impact is always regressive, either 
because employment is reduced or because the 
transfer to the consumer makes the person who 
is not covered contribute to the system of the 
person who is. 
The empirical evidence with respect to the 
transfers is very contradictory and is almost 
always based on the experience of the developed 
countries. Musgrove (1984) took into account 
both the employer's and the worker's 
contribution and found that in the short term the 
workers absorbed 75% of the cost and the 
employer 25 %, whereas in the medium and long 
term the burden was shared equally between 
workers and consumers. Break (1981), in a study 
of 64 countries which took only the employer's 
contribution into account —but assumed that 
the labour supply was inelastic and that the 
workers regarded the employer's contribution as 
part of their salary— concluded that the worker 
absorbed the entire burden. Break also maintains 
that in the developed countries the transfer to 
the consumer can occur in the short term but not 
in the long term in a situation of equilibrium, 
whereas in Latin America, with less 
competition, it is not known what would occur in 
the long term. Empirical simulations indicate 
that absorption by the worker has a less 
regressive impact than transfer to the consumer, 
although the difference is not great. 
According to the above, in the developed 
countries the insured person absorbs the 
employer's contribution through a cut in real 
wages and therefore the impact on employment 
and distribution is neutral (assuming that the 
contribution is uniform). In the developing 
countries, in contrast, the insured person does 
not absorb the employer's contribution and 
therefore either the employer absorbs it himself, 
or he reduces the labour demand, or he passes on 
the cost to the consumer. In the latter case the 
negative impact on employment would be less 
but not neutral, since there are some employers 
who could transfer it more easily than others 
(and the employer with no coverage would not 
have to transfer it). 
The most developed Latin American 
countries are closer to the first model. In these 
cases, we have high or almost universal coverage 
and according to some, an inelastic or less than 
perfectly elastic labour supply.3 But on the other 
hand, there does not appear to be any backward 
'Musgrove ( 1984) feels that even in the developing countries 
skilled labour is not plentiful and he assumes that in negotiations 
with the State or the employers the latter's contribution is included 
as part of the wage package. Consequently the skilled labour supply 
is not perfectly elastic and the workers probably pay a part of that 
contribution. 
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transfer in the short term (or at least this effect 
is very small), because of institutional and 
economic barriers and different patterns of 
behaviour (Foxley and others, 1977; Wilson, 
1984). In the first place, State intervention 
through labour and social security legislation is 
much greater in these countries than in many 
developed market economies; thus, for example 
the law sets a minimum wage which operates as 
a lower limit for wage reductions. Moreover, in 
some countries the employer must even pay the 
insured person's contribution when the latter's 
wage is only equal to the minimum (Mexico), or 
must pay the difference with the minimum 
contribution when the wage of the person 
insured is lower than that corresponding to that 
contribution (Peru), which considerably 
increases the labour cost of this group. In the 
second place, in several of these countries (such 
as Chile, at least up to the mid-1970s) the price 
fixing method most frequently used is the 
average cost plus a profit margin, which 
facilitates the forward transfer of costs. In the 
third place, in countries where there are 
measures to protect the consumer goods 
industries this also facilitates price increases. In 
the fourth place, the workers do not appear to 
perceive the employer's contribution as part of 
their wages, since the unions usually pressure 
the State to assign a heavier burden to the 
employer than to the person insured, and those 
issues are not included in collective bargaining 
since they are already regulated by law. In the 
fifth place, the law and the unions make it 
estremely difficult to dismiss anyone for 
economic reasons and the processing of such 
dismissals is lengthy and costly; the employer 
can of course avoid hiring additional labour. All 
of this suggests that transfer of costs to the 
consumer —at least in the short term— is the 
most normal procedure in these cases and it is 
also facilitated by oligopolistic structures 
although the elasticity of substitution of 
products whose prices are raised in this way 
must be close to zero if it is to have any major 
effect. The impact of this transfer on 
distribution must be regressive, since it affects 
the low-income group, which has no coverage 
and receives no benefits from the social security 
system but nevertheless contributes to it. In the 
few countries which have almost universal 
coverage, this regressive effect would diminish, 
if the contribution were also uniform. In this 
case, it could also happen that in the medium and 
long term there was a reverse or backward 
transfer with an effect similar to that in the 
developed economies. Although not all 
employers would be equally able to transfer the 
contribution to prices (because of differences in 
competition, substitution elasticity, etc.) there 
might be a sufficiently widespread increase in 
prices to accelerate inflation and reduce real 
wages. This could be the case in the countries 
with the most highly developed social security 
systems and high inflation rates. 
Another point of view stresses the 
differences, which are more marked in the least 
developed countries, between the formal sector 
(with total or partial coverage by social security) 
and the informal sector (no coverage). In this 
case it is assumed that the employer's 
contribution is transferred neither forward nor 
backward, so the effect would be a reduction (or 
stagnation) of the demand for labour in the 
formal sector. According to this approach, social 
security (sometimes linked to a policy of capital 
incentives) increases the relative cost of the 
labour factor as against capital which gives an 
incentive to replace labour by capital. This 
distortion triggers off a chain reaction: less 
labour is used in the formal sector, fewer 
workers move from the informal to the formal 
sector, the growing labour surplus has a 
depressive effect on wages in the informal 
sector, the wage differences between the two 
sectors grow, and since there is less available 
capital in the sector which receives no coverage, 
its productivity and economic growth decline 
compared to those of the sector which receives 
coverage (Kornevall, 1977). A change from 
wage-based contributions to a neutral financing 
system (or one which draws no distinction 
between the factors, such as value added tax) 
could correct this problem. 
It has rightly been pointed out that when the 
employer's contribution has a regressive effect, 
this cannot be double —there cannot be both a 
reduction in the demand for labour and transfer 
of the burden to the consumer, for both effects 
cannot operate with equal force or 
simultaneously (Tokman, 1984). It is quite 
possible, however, that one effect may occur in 
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the short term and another in the medium and 
long term in a single sector or in different 
sectors, for example as follows: a) a reduction in 
the demand for labour in the covered formal 
sector can in the long run result in a decline in 
real wages in the informal sector which has no 
coverage; b) transfer of prices can in the long 
term reduce the demand for products of the 
covered sector and affect employment, and c) a 
generalized transfer of the prices due to almost 
universal coverage can result in a cut in real 
wages in the medium or long term. 
Although it is not possible to make 
generalizations on such a weak theoretical and 
empirical base, everything that has been said 
suggests that when there is greater economic 
development and social security coverage, the 
impact seems to be greater in the direction of 
reducing real wages and possibly less as regards 
employment and the transfer to prices. The 
regressive impact seems to be greatest in the 
least developed countries. 
In general, benefits appear to have a more 
progressive impact on distribution than 
contributions but this largely depends on the 
extent of the coverage, the legislative uniformity 
and the type of programme: when there is wider 
universality and uniformity there is greater 
progressivity; furthermore, social assistance, 
health and family allowances programmes 
usually have a more progressive impact than 
pensions. Pensions are calculated, in almost all 
countries, in proportion to the income of the 
person insured and therefore reproduce the 
inequality in the general income distribution. In 
contrast, health benefits are basically equal, that 
is, they are not proportionate to income 
although in the stratified systems there are 
differences with respect to the availability and 
quality of the services. Moreover, the poorest 
groups have the greatest incidence of illness 
(because of poor nutrition and hygiene), and 
since private medical care is too expensive for 
them, the poor use the health services more 
often than the high-income groups; these latter, 
although they are covered by the health services 
usually prefer to use private doctors and clinics 
and only resort to the social security services in 
extreme cases. Notwithstanding this, it has been 
argued that the health programmes appear to be 
more progressive than they would have been if 
the benefits provided were measured not by 
their cost but by what the user would be prepared 
to pay for them (Musgrove, 1984). Family 
allowances also have a more progressive impact 
than pensions, since in many cases they are 
granted to low-income families and are almost 
always fixed (that is, an equal amount is paid in 
respect of each child) rather than being 
proportionate to wages. Furthermore, the 
poorer families are generally larger than middle-
income families. Finally, social assistance 
programmes are directed towards the poorest 
sectors of the population, so that they probably 
have the most progressive impact on income 
distribution. It has already been indicated that as 
the social security systems grow older, a larger 
percentage of the costs is allocated to pensions, 
thereby increasing the regressive impact; 
however, this is compensated for by extending 
the coverage and the social assistance 
programmes to those not previously covered 
(Mesa-Lago, 1980). 
3. Empirical studies in Latin 
America on the impact 
on distribution 
The empirical studies in Latin America on the 
global impact of social security are confined to a 
few countries, namely, the most developed ones 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Costa Rica), and do 
not always cover every programme. Moreover, 
because they use different methodologies and are 
of different dates it is not possible to make a 
strict comparison. 
The oldest study (ECLAC, 1969) is on 
Argentina and it measures the redistributive 
impact of the pension programme (1950-1960), 
showing a slightly progressive net effect: 1.7% 
was transferred from the top income strata 
(highest 10%) to the rest, combined as the lower 
strata. It would have been more appropriate to 
break down the redistributive effect within the 
90% lower strata in order to investigate the 
transfer between the 30% poorest (not covered 
at that time) and the intermediate sector with 
better protection. Diéguez and Petrecolla (1974) 
compared the average benefits between 
different groups covered in 1952 to 1972, 
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showing an almost perfect positive association 
between the amount of the benefit and the 
insolvency of the system: throughout the entire 
period, the armed forces paid the highest benefit 
but showed the largest deficit, which was 
covered by the State. 
Rezende's study (1974) on Brazil, conducted 
in 1973, reveals the most progressive effect of all 
the countries for which information exists: 
within the covered urban sector, the poorest 
group received benefits (sickness, maternity and 
pensions) that were double their contribution, 
whereas the highest income group received from 
one-third to one-fifth of what it contributed. 
This did not take into account the assistance 
programme which covers the rural sector and is 
partly financed by a contribution from the urban 
sector (and which should therefore have had a 
sharply progressive effect), nor did it include the 
armed forces and public employees (who 
probably received more than they contributed). 
Although the net effect of the overall system on 
distribution is not known, it was probably 
progressive (see also Rezende and Mahar, 1974). 
Two studies have been conducted in Costa Rica 
on the redistributive impact of the health and 
maternity programme. The study by Green 
(1977) on personal income was conducted in 
1973, when contributions still had ceilings and 
half of the population was not covered and it 
showed an almost neutral effect. The study by 
Briceño and Méndez (1982) on family income, 
carried out in 1978 (when the ceilings had 
already been removed and coverage had been 
considerably extended) indicated a regressive 
impact on financing but a very progressive one 
on benefits, and there was a slightly progressive 
net effect: 2% was transferred from the 20% 
highest income group to the 40% lowest income 
group. 
Chile is the country with most studies on the 
subject, and the majority of them indicate a 
regressive effect on income distribution because 
of transfers from the non-covered population to 
the covered and, within the latter group, 
transfers from lower income groups to higher 
income groups (Mesa-Lago, 1978). The most 
recent study (Foxley and others, 1977), 
conducted in 1969, shows a regressive effect on 
financing and a progressive effect on benefits, 
with a net or slightly progressive impact: 0.5% 
is transferred from the 2% with the highest 
income to the 30% with the lowest income. But 
this study excludes both the sector without 
coverage and the armed forces and other 
privileged groups, so that the net overall effect 
was probably regressive. During the same year a 
study on the health programme alone showed 
the only progressive transfer: the lowest income 
group received an average benefit 1.6 times 
greater than that of the highest income group 
(Arellano, 1976). 
While the studies on the more developed 
Latin American countries show a neutral or 
slightly progressive impact by social security on 
income distribution, it is logical to assume that in 
the least developed countries, with a much lower 
coverage, the impact is regressive. However, it 
will not be possible to substantiate this 
assumption within the limits of this article. 
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